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Indigenous Space and the
Landscape of Settlement:
A Historian as Expert Witness
Susan E. Gray
Abstract: This essay examines my work as expert witness in the case of U.S. v. Michigan,
a Indigenous use-rights case. I was charged with parsing the intention of a specific article
of the 1836 Treaty of Washington compelling land cession by Anishinaabe peoples and
with writing a history of land use in the area from that date to the present for the
Chippewa Ottawa Resource Authority (my employer). The challenges were not only
methodological (how do you estimate use from ownership?) and epistemological (what
constitutes proof that will satisfy both historians and lawyers?), but also sociological and
psychological: what happens when an associate professor puts her progress toward full
professor on hold for the sake of a court case?
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It has been over a decade since I committed myself to serving as an
expert witness in a treaty-rights case that pitted five federally recognized
Michigan Indian tribes against the State of Michigan. Since the conclusion
of U.S. v. Michigan in 2007, I have spoken publicly only once about my work
on behalf of the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, the Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of
Odawa Indians, the Sault Tribe of Chippewa Indians, and the Bay Mills
Indian Community. Since my audience for this presentation was primarily
graduate students in the Public History Program at Arizona State University,
where I teach, I offered my remarks largely in autobiographical form. In
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revisiting here my role in U.S. v. Michigan, I have chosen to retain this
autobiographical form as the best way of making accessible the complexity
of my experience as intellectual problem, political engagement, and fateful
career decision.1
My story begins in January of 2001, when I received a most peculiar e-mail
from someone who identified himself as Riyaz Kanji, an attorney with a law
firm in Ann Arbor, Michigan. After repeated attempts to reach me by tele-
phone at my office at ASU, he had been driven to contact me by e-mail. In
retrospect, Riyaz’s persistence in trying to making contact by telephone was
my first warning that working with lawyers would not be the same as working
with academics: in general, lawyers hate e-mail and love the telephone,
because the former is readily subject to discovery.
Riyaz failed to reach me by telephone at ASU because I was teaching that
semester at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the
Free University of Berlin, and when we finally connected by e-mail, he in-
sisted on telephoning me there. The upshot of our conversation was that he
asked me to serve as an expert witness on the case that became known as U.S.
v. Michigan, the second and final round of litigation over Indigenous rights
arising from the 1836 Treaty of Washington. In this treaty, Ojibwe and Odawa
peoples in what was then Michigan Territory were compelled to cede the
western half of the Lower Peninsula north of the Grand River and the eastern
half of the Upper Peninsula east of the Chocolate River.
‘‘You’re nuts,’’ said my husband, who eavesdropped on my Berlin conver-
sation with Riyaz. ‘‘What about your own work?’’ It was a good question and
my second warning that, if I took on the job, I would be leaving behind the
known world of academia, where scholarly output is supposed to appear at
regular intervals and in standardized shapes and sizes.
My best answer at the time to my husband’s question was, ‘‘but this law suit
is all about my work.’’ This remains my best answer today for how I spent what
turned out to be more than five years of my life. But, again in retrospect,
I would urge anyone contemplating serving as an expert witness who is not
a professional—that is, someone employed by a firm whose purpose is fee-for-
service testimony—to give more thought than I did about the real life im-
plications of doing two jobs at once. There is a reason that so many historians
who serve as expert witnesses are retired or nearing retirement. I, in contrast,
was an associate professor near the beginning of work on a second mono-
graph. If judged by the standard of the academic ladder, agreeing to serve as
an expert witness for U.S. v. Michigan was not a smart career move. So here is
the first lesson: should you decide to undertake such labor, do give some
consideration to the position from which you will work. If, like me, you hold
1. ‘‘Required for Settlement: One Historian as Expert Witness,’’ Arizona State University
Public History Brown Bag Presentation, October 2009. Other expert witnesses on treaty-rights
cases have adopted this stance for similar reasons. See Arthur J. Ray, Telling It to the Judge:
Taking Native History to Court (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001).
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a regular academic appointment and are not a full professor, you may pay
a price for what will be a considerable investment of time and energy on your
part. My department regarded my work on U.S. v. Michigan as a sideline to
what it had hired me to do: write books and articles, bring in grants, teach
classes, and sit on committees. My expert witness report could not count
toward my promotion because it did not constitute the second monograph
that is the sine qua non of promotion to full professor for historians. There was
even some reluctance to credit the report on my annual performance evalu-
ation because it was unpublished and because I had been paid for my work.2
In short, in my department’s view, my position as an expert witness was that of
an independent contractor who had chosen to sweat her labor. Today, the
school I now belong to has become far more flexible in its assessment of
research projects involving deep public engagement that do not result in
conventional books and articles. But an expert witness report, even one as
long as mine proved to be, would still not be considered comparable to
a monograph, and testimony would not be equated with publication. The
monograph remains the standard for promotion and tenure.3
Why, then, did I say ‘‘yes’’ to Riyaz Kanji? Doubtless, my husband was
right, and I was nuts. But that is not the whole story. Why did I say to my
husband that I had to take the case because U.S. v. Michigan was all about my
work? It was hardly because I am a crusader rabbit, although I could not have
devoted myself so wholeheartedly to the case had I not passionately believed
that the use-rights established by the Treaty of Washington remained in legal
force for the five Odawa and Ojibwe tribes who brought the suit. A brief
digression: collectively these tribes are known as CORA—the Chippewa-
Ottawa Resource Authority. There is considerable variation in the spelling
of Anishinaabemowin, the common language of the Three Fires of the Boo-
dewaadamigg (Potawatomi), Odawa (Ottawa) and Ojibwe (Chippewa). Here I
will refer to the peoples associated with CORA as Odawas and Ojibwes
2. My contract with CORA charged me with delivering an expert witness report to the
specifications of the attorneys directing the litigation on behalf of the tribes and to work with the
attorneys throughout the litigation process. I was paid at a flat hourly rate plus reasonable
research expenses, and I was allowed to hire my doctoral student, Brad Gills, as a research
assistant, also at an hourly rate. Brad’s work for me in effect funded his own dissertation research.
Once U.S. v. Michigan concluded in 2007, my report became solely my property.
3. At the time that I was working on U.S. v. Michigan, many American history departments
shared my department’s position with regard to expert witnessing and other forms of public
scholarly production. This is probably less the case now. In 2010, the Organization of American
Historians (OAH), the National Council on Public History (NCPH), and the American Historical
Association (AHA) issued a joint report on best practices for evaluating public history scholarship
in history departments. The report argues that such non-traditional scholarly productions should
be evaluated on their own terms and not by the standards of single-authored monographs and
articles. See John Dichtl and Debbie Ann Doyle, ‘‘Report Offers Guidelines for Recognizing
Public History in Promotion and Tenure,’’ and Working Group on Evaluating Public History
Scholarship, ‘‘Tenure, Promotion, and the Publicly Engaged Academic Historian: A Report,’’
Perspectives on History 48, no. 6 (September 2010): 11-16. Preliminary to their report, the
Working Group produced a detailed white paper, ‘‘Tenure, Promotion, and the Publicly Engaged
Academic Historian,’’ now posted on the NCPH website, www.ncph.org.
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because these are the more commonly used terms today. CORA, through the
tribal and external attorneys with whom I dealt, was my boss, and CORA paid
me for my work. The case that I undertook is known as U.S. v. Michigan
because the federal government came in on the side of the tribes against the
State of Michigan, so there were, in fact, three sets of attorneys—for the
tribes, for the federal government, and for the state—and three sets of expert
witness reports. My work on the case, however, was unique. The federal
witnesses were brought in too late to produce more than cursory reports, and
the state neglected to assign someone to do what I did until it was far too
late—for them.
A belief in justice for the tribes, however, would not in and of itself have
compelled me to take on this project. The compulsion was that what I was
asked to do as an expert witness sat literally in the midst of my research, both
for my first monograph, The Yankee West: Community Life on the Michigan
Frontier (University of North Carolina Press, 1996); and for what will soon
finally become my second: Lines of Descent: Family Stories from the North
Country (University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming). Indeed, I would
go so far as to say that my work on U.S. v. Michigan, while vastly complicating
my task, made it possible for me to write Lines of Descent, a multigenerational
biography of a mixed-heritage (Odawa and white) family in the right way. It
opened doors for me in Indian Country that might otherwise have remained
closed, and it made me profoundly sensitive to the interconnections among
place, space, memory, and narrative.
Article 13
U.S. v. Michigan was the second time that Article 13 of the Treaty of
Washington had been litigated in federal court. The article in its entirety
reads: ‘‘The Indians stipulate for the right of hunting on the lands ceded, with
the other usual privileges of occupancy, until the land is required for settle-
ment.’’ Use-rights clauses appear in many Indian treaties, and there have been
a number of suits, beginning in the 1970s, involving these use-rights, both in
the Great Lakes region and in the Pacific Northwest. Drafted by the federal
treaty commissioner, Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Article 13 is unique among
these clauses, however, in linking the viability of use-rights specifically to the
absence of white settlement. Thus, the outcome of U.S. v. Michigan literally
turned on the meaning of the phrase ‘‘until the land is required for
settlement.’’
Both sides in the case hired ethnohistorians, anthropologists, and linguists
to consider Article 13 from an Indigenous point of view, and both sides were
obviously much interested in the actual process of treaty negotiation—what
had happened when, and who had understood what when. The centrality of
an Indigenous point of view to U.S. v. Michigan was in accordance with long-
established canons of American Indian law that treaties should be interpreted
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as native signatories understood them and thus as favoring Indians even in
cases of ambiguous treaty language.4 This part of the work was in many ways
framed by precedent, because the 1836 treaty had been litigated in the late
1970s to the benefit of the tribes. In this suit, Anishinaabe fishing rights on the
Great Lakes were at stake. U.S. v. Michigan was therefore referred to as the
‘‘inland case’’ because it dealt with hunting and fishing on public lands.5
Although one of the expert witnesses for CORA, Charles Cleland, had been
involved in the original litigation, the CORA attorneys made every effort as
a deliberate strategy to hire witnesses who, like me, had never before been
involved in treaty-rights cases. Moreover, they would not let us talk to one
another, or anybody else except themselves about the case, and they strongly
discouraged us from reading the proceedings from the earlier trial. I did not
find this gag rule unduly constraining except when I had to describe my work
for CORA on my annual ASU performance evaluations. The idea behind
these prohibitions was twofold: as new witnesses we would bring a fresh
perspective to our interpretation of the 1836 treaty, and we could not be
attacked in deposition or on the stand as advocates for the tribes. In contrast,
the experts for the state, who were subcontracted by History Associates, a fee-
for-service firm with a long history of legal work in Indian country, periodi-
cally met together to craft a common argument, and they steeped themselves
in the proceedings of the first case.
My job took me further beyond the scope of the earlier case than did the
duties of any other witness on either side. My assignment came in two parts. I
was charged, first, with determining the intentions of Henry Rowe School-
craft, the treaty commissioner, in crafting the language of Article 13, partic-
ularly the clause ‘‘until the land is required for settlement.’’ Second, I was
asked to write a history of land use in the cession from 1836 to the present.6
These two tasks were inextricably linked, because they both turned on the
4. The canons of American Indian law were first articulated by John Marshall inWorcester v.
Georgia in 1832. Their development in the twentieth century and to the present day has owed
much to the work of Felix S. Cohen in his Handbook of Federal Indian Law, first published in
1942, and of Philip P. Frickey, particularly his ‘‘Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism, and Interpretation of Federal Indian Law,’’ Harvard Law Review 107 (1993):
381-440. For an overview of Cohen’s work, see Jill E. Martin, ‘‘The Miner’s Canary: Felix S.
Cohen’s Philosophy of Indian Rights,’’ American Indian Law Review 23, no. 1 (1998/99): 165-79.
For Frickey, see Sarah Krakoff, ‘‘The Last Indian Raid in Kansas: Context, Colonialism, and
Philip P. Frickey’s Contributions to American Indian Law,’’ California Law Review 98, no. 4,
Tribute Issue in Honor of Philip P. Frickey (August 2010): 1255-86. For a comprehensive history
of American Indian law, see David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground:
American Indian Sovereignty and Federal Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001).
5. For the litigation history of the 1836 treaty, see Charles E. Cleland, Faith in Paper: The
Ethnohistory and Litigation of Upper Great Lakes Indian Treaties (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2011), 45-100; Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Eagle Returns: The Legal History of
the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 2012), 2-55, 108-47.
6. ‘‘Article 13 in the 1836 Treaty of Washington and Land Use in the Cession, 1836 to the
Present,’’ 2005 report on behalf of the Chippewa Ottawa Resources Authority, U.S. v. Michigan,
2007.
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historical meaning of the word ‘‘settlement.’’ Understanding ‘‘settlement’’ in
turn required coming to terms with the ambitions and machinations of Henry
Rowe Schoolcraft.
Schoolcraft proved an extremely slippery character. He was a prolific,
pompous, and sloppy writer, with his eyes perpetually on the main chance.
In 1836, he was agent at Sault Ste. Marie for the Michigan Superintendency
of Indian Affairs, and married into the Johnstons, a Metis family who were
associated with the fur trade. Indeed, much of Schoolcraft’s authority as an
expert on Indians and Indian affairs in the Great Lakes rested on the cultural
knowledge that his in-laws shared with him.7 In 1836, Schoolcraft, who was
a good Jacksonian Democrat and knew full well that his future as a federal
employee depended on political patronage, was casting about for his next
appointment. Michigan was about to become a state, and there was consid-
erable political pressure both from Americans living in the territory and from
federal officials in Washington to clear the peninsulas of Indian title, even
though there were then very few whites in the northern Lower Peninsula or in
all of the Upper Peninsula. It was also widely assumed, in accordance with the
1830 Indian Removal Act, that the Anishinaabeg would be relocated west of
the Mississippi River once they had ceded their lands in Michigan.
In anticipation of these events, Schoolcraft was angling to become Super-
intendent of Indian Affairs for Wisconsin, which was then attached to Michi-
gan Territory and would be set off as a territory in its own right after Michigan
became a state in 1837. Hemore or less achieved his aim, thanks to his patron,
Lewis Cass, a former territorial governor of Michigan, who was then serving
as Andrew Jackson’s Secretary of War, an office that included oversight of the
Office of Indian Affairs. On the heels of the negotiations for the Treaty of
Washington in March of 1836, Cass appointed Schoolcraft Acting Superin-
tendent of Indian Affairs for Michigan and Wisconsin. Schoolcraft would hold
this position until 1841, when he was removed by a Whig administration for
gross mismanagement and corruption in office. He was therefore directly
responsible for the implementation of the 1836 treaty during the crucial first
five years after it was signed.
If it was in Schoolcraft’s interest to pursue aggressively a treaty with the
Michigan Anishinaabeg, he also needed to consider the position of his Ojibwe
7. The best biography of Schoolcraft remains Richard G. Bremer, Indian Agent and Wil-
derness Scholar: The Life of Henry Rowe Schoolcraft (Mount Pleasant, MI: Clarke Historical
Library, Central Michigan University, 1987). On the Johnston family, see Karl S. Hele, ‘‘The
Anishanabeg and Me´tis in the Sault Ste. Marie Borderlands: Confronting a Line Drawn upon the
Water,’’ in Karl S. Hele, ed., Lines Drawn upon the Water: First Nations and the Great Lakes
Borders and Borderlands (Waterloo, ON: University of Waterloo Press, 2008), 65-84. Also useful
is Marjorie Cahn Brazer, Harps upon the Willows: The Johnston Family of the Old Northwest
(Ann Arbor: History Society of Michigan, 1993). My spelling of Metis follows the guidelines
established by Nicole St-Onge, Carolyn Podruchny, and Brenda Macdougall in Contours of
a People: Metis Family, Mobility, and History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012),
in recognition that the white fur traders who wed Indigenous women were both French- and
English-speaking.
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relatives, who were largely concentrated in the Upper Peninsula. Article 13
shows that he did have those relatives in mind. Indeed, as the pivot on which
the entire treaty turned, and a provision on which the Indigenous negotiators
themselves insisted, the article was intended to protect at least some Anishi-
naabeg from the threat of removal from Michigan.
Understanding fully the politics of Schoolcraft’s language, however, meant
coming to terms with a concept that he did not view as political in a formal
sense because it was culturally imbued with the unthinking spatial politics of
colonization. I refer, of course, to ‘‘settlement,’’ the key word in Article 13, an
inexorable process leading to the creation of a desirable, because normative,
landscape. A ‘‘settlement’’ is a place epitomized by the process. The origins in
English of the word ‘‘settlement’’ were coeval with the first European inva-
sions of North America in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and were
frequently associated with the terms ‘‘colony’’ and ‘‘colonization.’’ At its root,
‘‘settlement’’ evokes the notion of dwelling and permanence.
To see how Schoolcraft used the term ‘‘settlement,’’ I worked my way
through his voluminous narratives of his travels around the present-day Mid-
west, and I found his usage quite consistent. Settlement for Schoolcraft was
not only associated with dwelling and permanence, but with a particular kind
of commercial, agrarian landscape, one in which cultivated fields, farms, and
towns have replaced the forest primeval. Indeed, wholesale tree removal
appears in his writings to define the stage of settlement following the removal
of Indian title and Indians from the land.8
To see whether Schoolcraft’s language was in any way idiosyncratic, I
compared it to usages of the term ‘‘settlement’’ in period dictionaries and
early nineteenth-century guidebooks and booster literature for the Old
Northwest. I found not only that Schoolcraft’s usage was utterly orthodox,
but that the association of settlement with a commercial, agrarian settlement
has run through writings about westward expansion down to the present.
And beyond: to this day, the language of settlement pervades state historical
8. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, A View of the Lead Mines of Missouri; Including Some
Observations on the Mineralogy, Geology, Geography, Antiquities, Soil, Climate, Population, and
Productions of Missouri and Arkansaw, and Other Sections of the Western Country (New York:
Charles Wiley & Co., 1819); Journal of a Tour into the Interior of Missouri and Arkansaw, from
Potosi, or Mine a` Burton, in Missouri Territory, in a Southwest Direction, toward the Rocky
Mountains, performed in the years 1818 and 1829 (London: Richard Phillips & Company, 1821);
Mentor L. Williams, ed., Schoolcraft’s Narrative Journal of Travels through the Northwestern
Regions of the United States Extending from Detroit through the Great Chain of American Lakes
to the Sources of the Mississippi River in the Year 1820 (East Lansing: Michigan State University
Press, 1992 [1953]); Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Travels in the Central Portion of the Mississippi
Valley: Comprising Observations on Its Mineral Geography, Internal Resources, and Aboriginal
Population (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint Co., 1975 [1825]); Narrative of an Expedition through
the Upper Mississippi to Itasca Lake, the Actual Source of this River; Embracing an Exploratory
Trip through the St. Croix and Burntwood (or Broule) Rivers; in 1832 (Philadelphia: Lippincott,
Grambo, and Co., 1855; reprint, Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint Co., 1973); and Personal Memoirs
of a Residence of Thirty Years with the Indian Tribes on the American Frontier (Philadelphia:
Lippincott, Grambo, and Co., 1851; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1975).
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writings about the Old Northwest.9 In northern Michigan in the early twen-
tieth century, the language of settlement was used to sell lots of cutover to
would-be farmers, boosters expressing vast relief that, the trees having all
been cut down, the work of settlement could now properly begin. Such
schemes mostly failed, because neither the land itself nor the climate of
northern Michigan would sustain mixed-grain agriculture. In Michigan, the
language of settlement finally went into decline in the 1920s and 1930s when
much of the cutover was reabsorbed into the public domain and reforested.
But I am ahead of my story.
That Schoolcraft subscribed to the common American understanding of
settlement as an inexorable process resulting in a commercial, agrarian land-
scape was thus incontestable. Parsing the key clause in Article 13—‘‘until the
land is required for settlement’’—proved not so straightforward. Schoolcraft
experimented with various formulations of the use-rights clause (‘‘until the land
is wanted’’ or ‘‘required’’) over a number of months before the actual treaty
negotiations began. Even more problematically from the perspective of the
attorneys and expert witnesses for CORA, he and some of his correspondents
during this same period also occasionally used the phrase ‘‘survey and sale’’ as an
apparent equivalent of ‘‘settlement.’’ ‘‘Survey and sale’’ became the center-
piece of the State of Michigan’s argument against the five Anishinaabe tribes’
claim that their use-rights remained intact in the ceded area. A parcel of land
was ‘‘settled’’ if it had passed out of the public domain and into private hands.
With the possible exception of a few forty-acre parcels in present-day Hiawatha
National Forest in the Upper Peninsula, it could be documented that all of the
cession was sold at some point. All of the land, therefore, had been required for
settlement, and the use-rights conferred by Article 13 were null and void.
The best evidence against this interpretation of Article 13 turned out to be
a draft of a letter that Schoolcraft wrote early in 1836 to Charles Trowbridge,
the cashier of the Bank of Michigan in Detroit.10 At Schoolcraft’s behest,
Trowbridge was in charge of organizing the journey of an Odawa delegation to
Washington for the treaty negotiations. In this draft, Schoolcraft plays with
several formulations of the use-rights clause, scratching out one after another
until he arrives at ‘‘until the land is required for settlement.’’ He stuck to this
language thereafter in his correspondence, so his deployment of the same
language in Article 13 is hardly surprising. He did not use the phrase ‘‘survey
and sale’’ in Article 13 because, after much thought, he had discarded it in
favor of ‘‘until the land is required for settlement.’’
9. See, for example, Andrew R. L. Cayton, Frontier Indiana (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-
versity Press, 1996); James E. Davis, Frontier Illinois (Bloomington: Indian University Press,
1998); and R. Douglas Hurt, The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1998). For an excellent account of the nineteenth- and twentieth-
century historiography of frontier and settlement for the Lower Great Lakes region, see James
Joseph Buss, Winning the West with Words: Language and Conquest in the Lower Great Lakes
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011).
10. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft to C. C. Trowbridge, January 13, 1836, Henry Rowe Schoolcraft
Papers, Bound Correspondence, Library of Congress.
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The second complication in interpreting Schoolcraft’s language in Article
13 was that the Senate modified the Treaty of Washington in a crucial way
after the Indigenous delegates had signed it in late March of 1836, forcing
Schoolcraft the following summer to seek Anishinaabe approval of a new
provision that was not in their interest. By conferring large, permanent re-
serves of land on the Odawa and Ojibwe signatories, the original treaty guar-
anteed their continued residence in Michigan. The only reference to removal
was the federal government’s offer to finance an Anishinaabe expedition
should the Indians wish to look for a new homeland west of the Mississippi.
In the hands of the Senate, however, the promised permanent reserves
became temporary, to be in effect for only five years, or longer at the pre-
sident’s pleasure, while the Anishinaabeg prepared themselves for removal.
In council with Odawas and Ojibwes on Mackinac Island in July, Schoolcraft
argued that the Indians could tolerate this change in the treaty because of
Article 13. That is, the Anishinaabeg could continue to occupy most of the
cession ‘‘indefinitely’’ because it lay so far north of the portion of the Lower
Peninsula then being transformed by white settlers into a commercial, agrar-
ian landscape.11 In other writings later that year to Michigan Senator John
Norvell about the value of the north country to the new state, Schoolcraft
made quite clear that he foresaw its wealth to be derived from timber, copper,
and iron, and he distinguished between the extraction of these resources and
settlement predicated on agriculture.12 In other words, Schoolcraft genuinely
believed that most of the cession would not be required for settlement for the
foreseeable future.
Mapping Settlement
What the attorneys for the state took to calling the ‘‘cultural understanding
of settlement’’ became the analytical framework for the second half of my
report—a study of land use in the cession from 1836 to the present. This
definition of settlement and, indeed, the whole second half of my report, took
the attorneys for the state by surprise because their expert witnesses assumed
that what Schoolcraft meant by Article 13 was ‘‘survey and sale’’ and never
considered the historical meaning of the word ‘‘settlement.’’ As a result, the
expert witness for the state charged with mapping settlement had a relatively
easy job. He used the digitized original land office records for Michigan to
generate a series of maps and accompanying statistics down to forty-acre
parcels (the smallest unit of sale) showing that virtually all of the land in the
cession had at some point been surveyed and sold to somebody.
11. Henry Rowe Schoolcraft to Lewis Cass, July 18, 1836, Michigan Superintendency
Mackinac Agency Letters Sent, National Archives Microfilm, M1, Roll 36.
12. John Norvell to Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, August 2, 1836 and Henry Rowe Schoolcraft to
John Norvell, August 4, 1836, Henry Rowe Schoolcraft Papers, Unbound Correspondence,
Library of Congress.
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My standard of settlement of settlement, however, was not ownership but
use defined as agriculture, so figuring out which parcels out of several million
acres had never been farmed was patently impossible. The methodology I
came up with was cluster sampling, but the creation of the data set was
complicated and laborious. County-level statistics of agricultural production
drawn from state and federal censuses were not helpful because the issue was
not what and how much was being grown, but how much land was in farms. I
had to find a way to gauge use from ownership and then to demonstrate use in
a time series. Moreover, I did not have comparable records for the Upper and
Lower Peninsulas, so I had to alter the methodology to account for different
base maps. In the Lower Peninsula, I selected five counties in the cession on
the basis of soil type as a proxy for suitability for agriculture, using the USDA
soil survey maps of the 1920s and 1930s. The counties were then ranked on
the basis of their proportion of Type I and II soils, those soils most suitable for
grain-based agriculture. These counties also had ownership atlases that ap-
peared at roughly twenty-year intervals from the 1870s to the 1950s. To bring
the survey down to the present, I obtained access to land-use statistics gen-
erated by the State of Michigan in the 1970s. By then, of course, soil classi-
fications had become much finer-grained, so reconciling them with the older
USDA categories became a project in its own right.
The trickiest part of the land-use survey, however, was determining which
parcels of land in the county atlases constituted farms. In this regard, I owe an
immense debt to my research assistant, Brad Gills, then a PhD candidate in
American Indian history at ASU, who did much of the hard work of tabula-
tion. How could we tell if parcel x was a farm or something else? The logic of
the tabulations rested on two points. The first is that for my first book, The
Yankee West, I had figured out what a nineteenth-century mixed-grain farm
looked like in the county atlases, as opposed to properties held for speculative
purposes. Farmsteads tended to run to standard size, usually 80, 120, or 160
acres. These acreages were consolidated into single parcels, and they con-
tained dwellings. Speculative holdings, in contrast, tended either to be much
larger or forties scattered around one or more townships. They did not con-
tain dwellings. The second point is that I knew that most of the non-farmer
owners were likely to be lumber outfits great and small, interested only in
picking off parcels containing white pine, which grows in pockets and not in
large expanses. In addition and of no small moment, a tremendous portion of
the cession did not directly pass from the federal government into private
hands, but was turned over to the State of Michigan, which in turn used it to
promote canal and railroad development. Internal improvement companies
then sold the land to lumbermen and the occasional settler. Not infrequently
canal and railroad developers were one and the same as the lumbermen.
Mapping these enormous federal grants of the cession to the state thus went
hand-in-hand with counting farms in the county atlases.
For the portion of the cession in the Upper Peninsula, I had to devise
a different methodology because of the paucity of county atlases, itself
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a reflection of how little of the land had ever been required for settlement.
Here I relied, first, on the maps of the Cleveland Cliffs Company, a huge iron
mining enterprise that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
owned the majority of lands in the Upper Peninsula portion of the cession.
Cleveland Cliffs engrossed this land for its timber, which supported its mining
operation. Much of the land purchased by Cleveland Cliffs never devolved
into the hands of modest individual owners. Instead, once the timber had
been logged off, the company simply stopped paying taxes on the land, which
allowed the federal government to acquire it cheaply in the early decades of
the twentieth century. Reforested, the land became the basis of the Hiawatha
National Forest. This process whereby public domain became temporarily
private property for the purpose of resource extraction and then returned to
the public domain occurred everywhere in the northern portion of the ces-
sion. Brad Gills’s sample of Hiawatha accession records housed at the national
forest headquarters in Escanaba showed clearly that the overwhelming major-
ity of forest land was never occupied by white settlers. In the same period,
many of what farms there were in northern Michigan were also abandoned
and reverted to the public domain for unpaid taxes. By the 1950s, much of the
land that had been ceded by the Anishinaabeg in 1836 had become state and
federal forest.
Thus the conclusion of Part II of my report: in both the Upper and Lower
Peninsulas, most of the land in the cession was never required for settlement
in the sense that Henry Rowe Schoolcraft and most Americans, then and
later, would have understood. In fact, the land-use survey largely confirmed
Schoolcraft’s prediction that settlement would only gradually proceed up the
Lower Peninsula and into the Upper Peninsula. In effect, it was only the lower
third of the cession in the Lower Peninsula, from present-day Grand Rapids
north to Manistee, and in the Traverse region around present-day Traverse
City, where one could see a majority pattern of land use consistent with the
cultural understanding of settlement.
In Retrospect
When it was released during discovery, my report blindsided the attorneys
and expert witnesses for the state, not only because they had not done their
own land-use study beyond the ‘‘survey and sale’’ tabulations, but because
none of their reports even troubled to define ‘‘settlement,’’ with the exception
of a single footnote in which a witness wrote that he meant what everybody
usually meant by the term. There was an attempt to scrounge up new wit-
nesses to rebut not my land-use study, which the state largely conceded, but
how I had defined the term ‘‘settlement.’’ This did not get very far, either. It
also turned out that the three major witnesses for CORA with regard to
Indigenous patterns of land use and perspectives on the treaty had all defined
white settlement much as I had done. These reports showed definitively the
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persistence of Indigenous patterns of land use—a seasonal round of hunting,
fishing, sugaring, gardening, and gathering—not only well into the twentieth
century, but to some extent down to the present day. Indeed, the seasonal
round proved to mesh well with the lumbering economy in northern Michi-
gan, coming under sustained attack only after the wood pulp industry finally
played out on the eve of World War II and as Michigan Department of
Natural Resources officers began to enforce hunting seasons and game limits
in the restored forests of the reformed public domain.13
Thus, the CORA attorneys’ gamble of bringing in fresh witnesses, keeping
them separate from one another, and asking new questions of what seemed to
be an old story paid off. In the end, the case did not go to trial, but into
arbitration, which resulted in the fall of 2007 in a compact between CORA
and the State of Michigan upholding Anishinaabe use-rights on public-
domain land in the cession, and carving out a way for Indigenous people to
work together with the Michigan DNR to conserve the resources of the
forest. I do not know how state officials felt about this accord, but the CORA
attorneys and tribal leaders believed that a lasting and just ‘‘settlement’’ had
been achieved.14
How has working on U.S. v. Michigan mattered to me? I would say, first,
that it woke me up as a scholar. Suddenly, what I did mattered beyond the
tyranny that I exert in the classroom. The case had real, immediate conse-
quences for real people. The facts mattered. Indeed, one of the unforeseen
effects of writing a report and undergoing deposition on me as a historian has
been to make me hypersensitive about accuracy in footnotes—my own and
everyone else’s. Lawyers do not care about historiography, although they do
understand that different historians argue different things, and that these
arguments fall into patterns over time. But in dealing with lawyers, you cannot
substitute the reigning historiographic line for evidence. You must argue from
specific documents, all of which must be submitted as part of discovery. I
would frankly go mad if I had to adhere to this evidentiary standard all of the
time, but my experience made me realize just how deceptive scholarly cita-
tions can be.
Second, although I know that some scholars are dubious about the ability
of lawyers to appreciate the subtlety of historical arguments, insisting as is
13. A good account of the compatibility of the seasonal round of activities with lumbering
operations in northern Michigan, which also incorporated Indigenous people as wage workers,
may be found in Bradley J. Gills, ‘‘The Anishnabeg and the Landscape of Assimilation, 1854-
1934,’’ (PhD dissertation, Arizona State University, 2008). For a related argument, see Brian C.
Hosmer, American Indians in the Market Place: Persistence and Innovation among the Meno-
minees and Metlakatlans, 1870-1925 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 1-108.
14. See, in this regard, a talk by Marc Slonim, one of the lead attorneys for CORA in U.S. v.
Michigan about the significance of use-rights litigation for the development of conservation
practices involving Indigenous people and incorporating Indigenous knowledge in the Great
Lakes region. Slonim’s talk is posted on the website of the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife
Commission, itself a product of over a generation of treaty-rights litigation in Michigan, Wiscon-
sin, and Minnesota. www.glifwc.org/minwaajimo/speech/Marc%20Slonim.pdf.
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their legal wont that things are either x or y, I did not find this to be the case.
The people with whom I worked knew a lot of history, and they wanted to
learn from me and the other witnesses. We spent literally hours—days—
weeks—on the telephone reviewing each other’s positions. The lawyers re-
viewed the experts’ reports, most of which, incidentally, were monographic in
length—and the experts, in turn, reviewed the pleadings at every stage. It was
profoundly collaborative, interdisciplinary work, exactly the kind of endeavor
in which my university now strongly encourages its faculty to engage. It was
not, however, always comfortable. I frequently felt as though I were taking
a final examination in a class for which I had not signed up. Depositions are
flat-out adversarial, something I think I felt with particular acuteness as one of
only two women experts for the case. Either you like combat or you do not. I
found out that I did, so I learned something about myself.
Which brings me, third, to whether I would do this kind of work again, or
recommend it to others. Since U.S. v. Michigan, I have been approached
about serving as an expert witness on three other cases, two of which were
sorely tempting because they both involved my old friends the warranty deed
and the county atlas. In the interests of getting myself promoted before I
retire, I turned down all three requests, but there may be other opportunities
and, if the right one comes along, I might say ‘‘yes.’’ I do have two limiting
conditions on any further work as an expert witness that I think anyone
contemplating such a commitment ought to consider: first, since I am not
a lawyer, I would not take on a case unless I believed that I was on the side of
truth and right. In this I am not alone. Charles Cleland, who worked on
a number of important treaty-rights cases while a professor of Great Lakes
archaeology at Michigan State University, has told me of a case that he turned
down because the evidence simply would not support the position that the
Indigenous litigants wanted him to defend. Second and relatedly, I have no
interest in becoming a professional hired gun, an option that I could have
pursued in the wake of U.S. v. Michigan. The possibility of doing what I do
under very different professional auspices compelled me to think seriously
about how much I had invested in being a professor. It was a useful exercise.
And finally, as a historian, what did I learn from this particular case? In the
end, U.S. v. Michigan was all about competing Indigenous and white attitudes
toward and ways of living on the land. But the portrait of Indian-white rela-
tions in northern Michigan that emerged from the case deviated sharply from
the standard ‘‘two worlds’’ interpretation of this competition, what Vine De-
loria, Jr., witheringly called the ‘‘never the twain shall meet’’ approach to the
study of Indigenous histories and cultures. That is, Indian is Indian, and white
is white, and never the twain shall meet.15 Instead, U.S. v. Michigan revealed
15. Vine Deloria, Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1989 [1969]), 79-86. For a recent collection dedicated to moving beyond ‘‘two
worlds’’ thinking, see James Joseph Buss and C. Joseph Genetin-Pilawa, Beyond Two Worlds:
Critical Conversations on Language and Power in Native North America (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 2014).
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the development over time of a shared landscape, one from which Indigenous
people were never removed and that in many of its essentials remains with us
today.
To this landscape, the national narrative of conquest and removal does not
apply, which is not a small thing for our larger understanding of the history of
Indian-white relations in the United States. It is not too much to say that the
cultural understanding of settlement that proved so key to U.S. v. Michigan
underwrites much of that narrative of conquest and removal in the Old North-
west and elsewhere. Put simply, the cultural understanding of settlement
removes Indians along with the trees from the story of white America. Ex-
pressed in federal Indian and land policies, settler booster literature, profes-
sional histories, and even the sportsman’s column in the Saturday newspaper,
the cultural understanding of settlement has masked our ability to see the
shared landscape, even when we are in the midst of it. To begin to see this
shared landscape is also no small thing.
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